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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

=========================================
S'.i'ATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

vs.

ALEX ORNELAS,

Case No. 10879
Appellant.

=========================================
Appellant moves the court for a rehearing on appellant's appeal and for
modification of the Court's order for a new trial, to grant the defendant
herein an acquittal on said matters.
lo

The decision of the court granting a new trial in the above entitled

matter, is contrary to law.

At trial the defendant was found guilty of

contributing to the delinquency of a minor in that defendant "took Wanda
Palmer" without the knowledge or consent of the parents.

However, defendant

was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor "by hypodermically
administering drugs."

Defendant is entitled to be charged with a specific

crime so that he may know the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and the effect of the judgment of guilty of "taking" is to find him

not guilty of "administering drugs", which was the only violation of which
defendant has been chargedo

Defendant was thereby substantially prejudiced

in his defense upon the merits and is entitled to an acquittal.
2

0

Defendant's constitutional rights entitling him to due process of

law, were violated in that he was convicted upon a charge that was not made
against him.

It is clear that where a charge is not substantiated by the

evidence introduced, it amounts to a due process violation to impose a
conviction on other grounds.
3..

Defendant has been placed in jeopardy once on the basis of the

acts here in question, before competent court and that court failed to find
d~fendant

guilty of the violations charged.

The constitution prohibits

the courts from again placing defendant in jeopardy for the same offense.
I:buble jeopardy is not against double punishment for the same offense, but
is protection against double jeopardy, that is a second trial for the same
offense.

The idea underlying the doctrine is that the state with all its

resources and power, should not be allowed to place a person in jeopardy
more than once for the same offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurityo

Having been brougnt before a competent court once on the

basis of his alleged actions and the court having failed to find him guilty,
defendant is entitled to an acquittal in the above entitled matter.
ARGUMENT
The decision of this court on defendant's appeal seems to be based on
a finding that the trial court erred in convicting him for violation of
U.C.A. § 55-10-80(3) when he was charged with a violation of§ 55-10-80(1).
However, there is nothing in the trial court record or in the briefs of
appellant or respondent to allege error on the part of the trial court.
The case of Cobb v. Snow, 14 Utah 2d 170, 380 P. 2d 457 (1963), has been cited
by the court for the proposition that "where defendant claims of error and
a judgment is nullified at his request, what he is entitled to is a fair
trial eliminating the error."

That case deals with the situation in which

there has been a trial, evidence presented on the issues, but errors committed
therein are sufficient to deny him justice.

However, that case did not even

consider the question in point here as to when the court finds defendant
guilty of a violation with which he has not been charged or in other words
not insufficiency of evidence or error therein, but a total absence of
admissible evidence on the crime with which he was convicted.

Cobb v. Snow

is clearly not in point here, and to find defendant guilty of an offense
of which he has not been charged, is contrary to the law.
In State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 111 P. 2d 455 (1942) this Court

observed:
"The purpose of a bill of particulars, is to inform the defendant of
the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare
his defense."
It is clear that at conunon law, a variance WITH RESPECT TO A MATERIAL
~~TTER was fatal and entitled the defendant to an acquittal.

Code provides that:

The Utah

"No variance between the allegations of an information, indicbnent,
or bill of particular, which state the particulars of an offense
'
'
wnether
amended or not, and the evidence offered in support thereof
shall be grounds for an acquittal of the defendant." U.C.A. § 77-21-43(2)
(1953).
This court in State v. Meyers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 302 P. 2d 276 (1956),
noted that the foregoing statute applies to matters of form NOT SUBSTANCE,
and that the statute could not override the constitutional guarantee that
"the accused shall have the right to demand the nature and the cause of the
c.ccusation against himo"

The court concluded:

"It VJOuld be a mockery of the Constitutional right of a defendant to
allow the state to falsely state the particulars of the offense charged,
and then without amendment, and without giving defendant additional
tirn<=> to meet new evidence beyond these particulars obtain a conviction
fow1ded on these particulars • • • • To be material the variance must

go to tJ1e extent of showing the offense proved is not the offense
charged."

It is a rule of universal recognition that the allegations and the proof
must correspond and if there is a variance as to a matter of substance and
which is material to the proof of said charges it is the basis for acquittal
thereon.
res~ect

The fatality of the variance depends "not on whether it is in
of a material matter, BUT on whether the VARIANCE ITSELF is material,

or affects the substantial right of the accused." (Emphasis added.)
Indicb~ents

42 CJS,

and Information § 254.

This court reversed the conviction of a defendant charged with ernbezzeling concluding:
"In a criminal proceeding it is not sufficient to show merely that the
accused has been dishonest, or that he is a cheater, or otherwise bad
character. He is entitled to be charged with a specific crime so that
he may know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and the
STATE MUST PROVE SUBSTANTIALLY AS CHARGED, the offense it relies upon
for conviction." State v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 104, 378 P. 2d 352 (1963)0
The conviction of defendant upon grounds with which he was not charged,
was in violation of his constitutional right entitling him to due process
of law under Utah Constitution, Article 1,
United States Constitution.

§

7 and the 14~ Amendment of the

In 21 Am. ~· 2d, Criminal Law, § 226 instructions

of th'? U.S. Suprerne Court were outlined:
"It is similarly a violu.tion of due process to convict a man upon a
charge which was not made, (Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60
s. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 59.5° Ct.
255 81 L. Ed. 278). Accordingly where a conviction is so devoid of
evi~entiary support as to amount t~ a due process violation, THE COURT
CP.J IT JOT concern itself with whether the evidence proves commission of
~~ome other crime, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248,
7 L 0 Ed. 2 0 7 • II

-3-

In

addition to the foregoing, defendant has now been placed in jeopardy

once on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor "by administering drugso"

He was brought before a competent court and tried for his

actions and it is clear that to require him to come before the court again
on the same charge, would place him in double jeopardy in violation of
Article 1 s 12 of the Utah Consti'tuti'on
d
an the Fifth Amendment of the
s
Constitution of the United States.
"vJl1ere an accused has once been placed on trial in a court competent to try an offense of the character charged, and has been
found not guilty of said offense, tr,e state can never place him
on trial again for the same offense no matter how irregular the
proceedings have been." 22 CJS, Criminal Law, § 268.

Defr~ndr.;nt

was charged with violation of § 55-10-80(1) and found guilty

of violating § 55-10-80(3).

The effect of such a conviction is to find him

not guilty of violating§ 55-10-80(1)0

The State cannot therefore retry

defendant for his actions once he has already been placed in jeopardy for

L~e same acts.

This court in discussing double jeopardy stated that the

plea of double jeopardy is sufficient whenever it shows that the second trial
is based on the same criminal act, both in fact and in law, which was the
basis of an indictment on which the defendant was formerly brought to trialo
State Vo Thomoson, 58 Utah 291, 199 Pac. 161 (1921); see also, Price Vo United
States, 156 Fed. 950 (9~ Ciro 1907); Dill Vo Colorado, 19 Coloo 469, 36 Pac.
229 (1894); State v. Danhof, 161 Wash. 441, 297 Pctco 195 (1931)0
The court has therefore placed defendant in the position where he cannot
be tried again without violation of his constitutional rights, but yet he
is deprived of hJ.S
. freedom on the basis of a conviction which this court
has reversed.
WHEREFORE, appellant prays tha t th e court grant him a rehearing of
·
appellant's appeal for a modification
o f the court's order for a new trial

.S?r ~ay

to grant the defendant herein, an acquittal on said mattero
DATED this

of

, 1967.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALEX ORNELAS,

Appellant,
Case No.

vs.
STATE O.F UTAH,

Respondent,

)

10879

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE~IENT

O.F NATURE OF CASE

The appellant, Alex Ornelas, appeals his conviction
in the Juvenile Court of the Second District Court,
State of Utah for the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The appellant was charged with contributing to
the delinquency of a minor by hypodermically admin-

1

istering drugs. The trial court found the appellant
guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
but not by the manner and means alleged in the complaint. Subsequent to conviction the court entered
judgment imposing a sentence of confinement to jail
for six months, suspended upon condition that the appellant be committed to the Utah State Prison on
parole violation. The appellant is presently in the Utah
State Penitentiary on the conviction in the instant case
for which his parole was violated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits the decision of the trial court
should be dismissed and a judgment of acquittal
granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The complaint in the instant case charged appel·
lant with contributing to the delinquency of a minor
by "hypodermically administering drugs" to the com·
plaining witness ( R. 60) . The trial judge in his find·
ings of fact and conclusions of law found that appellant
"took ~Tanda Palmer" without the consent of her par·
ents, thereby contribut:ing to the delinquency of a
minor (R. 47).
The complaining witness was released temporarily
from the Utah State Mental Hospital for appearance
at trial. She had been sent to the hospital, in the words
2

of the complaining witness, "for sniffing glue and for
using dope''. (Tr. line 17, p. 2).
The complaining witness testified that a friend of
hers took her to the defendant's aparament. "\Vhen
asked by the prosecutor to give the name of the friend
she said, "I won't answer that.'' (Tr. line 29, p. 4).
\Vhen told by the prosecutor that she must answer, she
responded, "No, I won't" (Tr. line 32, p. 4).
She did not know even the general location of the
apartment where she was taken, but merely that it was
in the city (Tr. line 23, p. 4) . The prosecutor then
asked what she did after meeting appellant in his
apartment. He said, "did you go anywhere with him,
did you do anything with him, did you have any further
contacts with him?" and she answered, "No" (Tr. line
12, p. 5). "\Vhen asked if there were other people in the
apartment she said, "I don't know" (Tr. line 3, p. 5).
"\Yhen asked the same question again by the prosecutor
she said, "I think so" (Tr. line 32, p. 5). The same
question rephrased by the prosecutor produced the response, "I don't know'' (Tr. line 18, p. 6).
\Vhen asked whether she used the needle herself
the record shows, "Miss Palmer: (inaudible)" (Tr.
32, p. 6). "\Vhen again asked what happened to the
needle she said, "I used it ... I stuck it in me" (Tr.
line 4 & 6, p. 8). "\Vhen asked once more, "did you
stick it in yourself?" (Tr. line 7, p. 8), she said, "I
can't remember" (Tr. line 8, p. 8 ) . Later she said with

3

refence to the needle, "He let me ... He gave me an
injection of" (Tr. line 10 and 12, p. 9).
The contents of the needle were said to be a white
liquid (Tr. line 2, p. 8). The fact that the liquid was a
drug and not sugar and water, or milk was not proven
at trial.
After leaving appellant's apartment the complaining witness stayed four days in a hotel during which
time she did not see appellant (Tr. line 32, p. 10).
During those four days she admitted that the people
whom she was staying with gave her drugs three times
a day (Tr. line 19, p. 17). At the end of four days she
went to see her sister-in-law, whose immediate response
was, in the words of the complaining witness as follows:
" ( S) he thought something was wrong. She
thought I had been sniffing glue ... " (Tr. line
l,p.19).
Her sister-in-law then took her to the University
Hospital where a medical student asked to give her a
physical examination and she refused. He said that her
arms had puncture holes in them but could form no
opinion as to how long it had been since the initial
punctures. (Tr. line 2, p. 30). The medical student
testified that he took some blood to test the barbituate
level. He did not make the test himself, (Tr. line 12,
p. 31), and there was no evidence introduced at trial
as to what the results of the test produced.
The trial judge made findings that the appellant
"took Wanda Palmer" without the consent of her par·

4

en ts ( R. 47). He did not find that the appellant "adminisered drugs" to the complaining witness as charged
in the complaint (R. 60). On the contrary, based on
the above evidence the trial judge found appellant guilty
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor by taking
without the consent of her parents, and sentenced
him to six months in the county jail, the maximum for
a misdemeanor.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MATERIAL Y ARIAN CE B E T '¥ E E N
PLEADING AND PROOF IS FATAL AND
ENTITLES APPELLANT TO AN ACQUITTAL.
The complaint alleged in this case that the defendant contributed to the delinquency of a minor by "hypodermically adrninisteriny drugs to the said child and
this without the knowledge or consent of the parents"
(R. 47). The trial judge in his findings of fact found
a violation of a separate offense. He found that the
defendant "took Wanda Palmer without the knowledge
or consent of the parents" (R. 60). The only language
in the Juvenile Act that has any reference to taking is
found in Utah Code Annotated of 1953, Section 55-1080 ( 3) Laws of Utah (1965) as follows:
" (a) ny person who forcibly takes a child fr?m,
or encourages him to leave the legal or physical

5

custody of any person, agency or institution in
which the child has been legally placed for the
purpose of care . . . "
Since the complaining witness left home and was
taken by a friend of hers (Tr. line 27, p. 4) , whom she
is either shielding or can't identify, the statute obviously
has no application to defendant. The defendant did not
take the complaining witness, nor was she at any time in
the legal custody of any person, agency or institution
for the purpose of care. Even assuming arguendo that
the defendant took her from the custody of the unknown
driver (the record states that the driver took the com·
plaining witness to defendant's apartment, (Tr. line
27, p. 4) ) , she certainly was not in the legal custody
of the driver who picked her up. The statute was aimed
at the evil of preventing parents from removing chil·
dren from the homes they had been placed in for adop·
tion or temporary custody pending a determination of
a charge of parental abuse. The policy of the statute
is not frustrated nor is it applicable in this case where
the complaining witness left home on her own volition,
without inducement on the part of the defendant.
It is, therefore, clear that the defendant-appellant
was neither charged with nor were there facts suffi·
cient to prove a violation of Utah Code Annotated
of 1953, Section 55-10-80(3) Laws of Utah (1965).
The general offense of contributing to the delin·
quency of a minor has been repealed, Section 55-10-51,
Utah Code Annotated ( 1953). The only provision

6

other than 55-10-80 ( 3) which could apply to the facts
is 55-10-80 ( 1) . The juvenile court's jurisdiction must
have been exercised under the section which states that
" (a) ny person who . . . contributes to, or becomes responsible for the neglect or delinquency of a minor
... " Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 55-10-80
( 1) added by Laws of Utah ( 1965). Since defendant
was charged with a violation of 55-10-80 ( 1) and the
trial judge found a violation of 55-10-80 (3) the defendant had no opportunity to defend himself against
the otf ense in the code charged in the complaint and
the state failed to meet its burden of proof. State v.
Beckendorf!, 4 Utah 79, 10 P. 1073 (1923).
This court in State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 111
P. 2d 455 ( 1942) observed:
"The purpose of a bill of particulars is to
inform the defendant of the particulars of the
offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his
defense."
It is at once apparent that the purpose of the bill
of particulars or complaint was subverted in this case
where the defendant-appellant was charged with one
offense and found guilty of another without an opportunity to prepare a defense.

A material variance between pleading and proof
eutitled the defendant to an acquittal. In 42 C.J.S.
Indictments and Informations,§ 254 (1944), the following historical summary is found:

7

"While it has been held that a variance with
respect to a material matter is fatal and entitles
the accused to an acquittal, this being the rule
at common law, the rule has been radically
changed. The fatality of the variance depending
not on whether it is il). respect of a material matter, but on whether the variance itself is material
or affects the substantial rights of the accused."
In Utah the common law has been altered in Sec·
tion 77-21-43 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as fol·
lows:
"No variance between the allegations of an information, indictment or bill of particulars, which
state the particulars of an offense, whether
amended or not, and the evidence offered in sup·
port thereof shall be grounds for acquittal of the
defendant. The court may at any time cause the
information, indictment, or variance to conform
to the evidence."
This court in State v. Meyers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 302
P. 2d 276 ( 1956), in noting that the foregoing statute
applies to matters of form, not substance and that the
statute could not be used to override the constitutional
guarantee that "the accused shall have the right ...
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him." UTAH CONST., Art. I § 12, observed:

"It would be a mockery of the constitutional
right of a defendant to allow the state to falsely
state the particulars of the offense. charged. ~nd
then without amendment, and without g1vmg
defendant additional time to meet new evidence
beyond these particulars obtain a conviction
founded on such evidence."
8

Therefore, the common law rule that a variance
entitles the defendant to an acquittal has been altered
in Utah only with regard to matters of form. This
court's interpretation of the statute is further supported
by a provision in that same section which gives defendant a right to appeal based on a variance where he
has been prejudiced in his defense upon the merits.
Section 77-21-43 ( 4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
provides:

"No appeal, or motion made after verdict,
based on any such defect, imperfection, omission
or variance shall be sustained unless it is affirmativel,1; shown that the defendant was in fact
prejudiced thereby in his defense upon the
merits.''
Since defendant was charged with "hypodermically
administering drugs'' to the complaining witness and
the trial judge made findings of fact that he "took her"
without the consent of her parents it is at once obvious
that the defendant was prejudiced in his defense upon
the merits for he was completely surprised. He had
no warning that he had been charged with taking the
complaining witness and the first notification of that
charge came in the trial judge's findings of fact at the
conclusion of the trial. 'Vhile this court has stated that
it would be a mockery of justice to introduce evidence
falsely stating the particulars of an offense, State v.
Meyers, supra, how much more of a mockery would it
be to falsely accuse of one offense and then without
any evidence find a violation of a separate offense as in
the instant case?

9

\Vhere a person is charged with a lesser included
offense, petty larceny, and the state attempts to prove
grand larceny the defendant is entitled to a new trial
to afford him time to meet the further allegations as
to value. This court observed in State v. Meyers, supra:
"Thus in the instant case had the bill of par·
ticulars alleged the value of the property stolen
from Luck to have been $3 for the wallet, $20
cash, $60 for the watch and $45 for the glasses
and the proof had shown them to be worth $2,
$10, $50, and $30 respectively, no substantial
prejudice to defendant's right would be shown
and the conviction would be affirmed on that
ground. \Vhen, however, the bill alleged $22
total value and the state offers to and contends
it did prove $92, the defendant must be afforded
time to meet such further allegations of value."
But where one is charged with one offense and
found guilty of another separate offense he is entitled
to an acquittal. In State v. TaJJlor, 14 Utah 2d 107,
378 P. 2d 252 (1961), this court held that a person
charged with embezzlement may not be convicted, even
though he admits in court to having stolen the goods,
for the state must prove that he obtained the goods
through a trust. One who wrongfully obtains goods
cannot have obtained them through a trust and con·
verted them for his own use. Thus in acquitting and
reversing the judgment against the defendant this
court observed:

"The judgment must stand or fall upon the
proof or lack thereof, of the crime with which
the state charged the defendant, essayed to prove,
10

and of >which he stands convicted . ... Since the
state did nut prove the charge upon which the
conviction is grounded it is reversed."
Massachusetts has a statute similar to the Utah
statute on variance which has also been interpreted
as being applicable to matters of form and not substance. Iu fact the statute specifically provides that
an acquittal is proper when the defendant has been
prejudiced in his defense. In Commonwealth v. Stone,
300 Mass. 160, 14 N .E. 2d 158 ( 1938), the l\iassachusetts court observed:
"(T)he provision of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 277,

§ 35 that 'a defendant shall not be acquitted on

the grounds of a variance between the allegations and the proof if the essential elements of
the crime are correctly stated, unless the defendant is duly prejudiced thereby' does not apply.
. . ( T) he evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to prove the commission of the offense
in the manner charged in the indictment, and
that the denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty was prejudicial
error. "
In the instant case, not having sufficient evidence
to prove the commission of the offense in the manner
charged, the trial judge then made findings of fact
of an offense which had never been lodged against
defendant. Defendant-appellant was charged with
"hypodermically administering drugs", a point on which
the evidence is at best equivocal (Tr. line 2, p. 7; line
4, p. 8), and found guilty of taking the complaining
11

witness "without the knowledge or consent of the parents'', an offense which is inapplicable to the facts as
stated previously. This court in State v. Beckendorf!,
supra, observed that though an offense may be committed in a number of ways, the state has the burden
of proving the crime was committed in the mode charged
in the complaint.
On the basis of the record, as in the Stone and Taylor
cases, the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient
to prove the commission of the offense in the manner
charged and defendant was materially prejudiced in
his defense thereby affording grounds for an acquittal.

POINT II
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO WAIVE
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL IN OPEN COURT AS REQUIRED BY
LAW IS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
An extensive search of the record reveals that the
defendant was denied his constitutional right to " .. ·
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. UTAH
CONST. Art. I, § 12. The record is barren of any
reference whatsoever to defendant's having waived his
right to a jury trial. This right has been implemented
by a statute which requires that in criminal cases
" ( i) ssues of fact must be tried by a jury ... " Section
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77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That the con-

stitutional right to a jury trial was not intended to be
abridged in criminal cases involving adult offenders in
the juvenile court is made clear in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 55-10-81 added by ch. 165 Section
19 ( 1965) as follows:
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice and
procedure of the juvenile court shall conform
to the practices and procedure provided by law
or rule of court for criminal proceedings in the
district court, except that the proceedings may
he commenced by complaint and a trial by jury
shall consist of four jurors:'
Further, that the legislature deemed the right to
jury trial applicable to misdemeanors as well as to
felonies in district court proceedings to which Section
55-10-81 applies, and that the right is inviolate unless
waived in open court is demonstrated in Section 77-1-11,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows:

"No person shall be convicted of a public offense unless by the verdict of a jury, accepted
and recorded by the court or upon a plea of
guilty. or upon a judgment against him upon
a demurrer when he refused to plead or upon a
judgment of a court for a public offense not
amounting to a felony, a jur;1J having been
waived:'
The sanctity of this right is further demonstrated
by the mandate that the right may only be waived in
ope11 court. Section 77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, provides as follows:
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"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, but
in all cases except when a sentence of death may
be imposed trial by jury may be waived by the
defendant. Such waiver shall be made in open
court and entered in the minutes."
According to a similar provision in the California
Constitution, consent may not be implied but must
expressly appear in the court records. The pertinent
part of that provision states that a trial by jury may
be waived in all criminal cases when " . . . expressed in
open court by the defendant and his counsel." CALIF.
CONST. Art I, § 7. 'Vhere counsel for the defendant
and the district attorney stipulated in open court that
the right to jury trial had been waived the California
court in reversing and remanding for a new trial stated
in People v. Spinale, 100 C.A. 600, 280 Pac. 691 (1940)
that:
"When the Constitution has prescribed the
method and form of such waiver, it cannot otherwise be accomplished."
In a similar case involving counsel's attempted
waiver of defendant's right to a jury trial the same
court in People v. Garcia, 98 Cal. App. 702, 277 Pac.
7 47 ( 1929), observed:

"It is quite apparent that respondent was deprived of a Constitutional right which he di.d
not waive in the manner required by the orgamc
law of this state, and that the order entered pursuant to an attempted but abortive waiver was
errer which the trial court had power to rectify
upon a motion for a new trial . . . From the pre-
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vious rulings and the express language of the
Constitution, it is at once obvious that this inviolate constitutional right may not be taken
away in disregard of the fundamental legal
privilege and power of election guaranteed to
the party charged, by attempting to vest in his
representative the dual capacity and authority
of counsel and accused."
Further, it has been held that where the clerk's
minutes showed that all defendants waived their rights
to a jury trial but the reporter's transcript did not show
a waiver by the appellant-defendant, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the defendant and a new trial
granted in order to protect the constitutional right
to a jury trial. The California court in People v. Washinyton, 95 C.A. 2d 454, 213 P. 2d 70 (1950), observed:
"Under the circumstances in the present case
it is not clear that the defendant Washing ton
personally expressed in open court that he consented to a waiver of the trial by jury, and for
that reason the judgment as to the defendant
\V ashington and the order denying his motion
for a new trial should be reversed, and the case
as to said defendant should be remanded for
a new trial."

The Word Demand Should Not Be Interpreted
In The Abstract, But In The Sense Intended In The
Act.
\Vhile it is possible to argue to the contrary it is
not reasonable to presume that the legislature intended
to restrict the right to jury trial in cases of adult offend-
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ers in the juvenile court merely because of language
which uses the word "de,mand'' in reference to the procedure for transferring a case to a city or county court
in the event that a defendant does not plead guilty
or waive his right to a jury trial. The Juvenile Court
Act provides in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section
55-10-81, added by ch. 165 Section 19 ( 1965) as follows:

"If the defendant in proceedings under this
section shall demand a jury trial, the court may
transfer the case to a city court or county court
if such a court is in existence in the county in
which the offense was committed."
To construe that provision as requiring the defendant to demand a jury or waive his constitutional right
would be inconsistent with the first paragraph in the
same section. Utah Code Annotated of 1953, Section
55-10-81 added by ch. 165 Section 19 ( 1965) provides in the first paragraph as follows:
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice
and procedure of the juvenile court shall conform to the practice and procedure provided by
law or rule of court for criminal proceedings in
the district court, except that the proceedings
may be commenced by complaint and a trial by
jury shall consist of four jurors."
As noted previously in the district courts the right
to a jury trial in misdemeanor charges must be " ...
waived in open court and entered in the minutes." Section 77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, see also
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Section 77-1-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It is
submitted that the intent of the legislature was merely
to provide the juvenile court with a means for transferring jury cases due to the fact that city and district
courts are better equipped to handle jury trials. \Vhile
it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that
effect must be given, if possible, to every word in a
statute, this is not an inflexible doctrine requiring blind
application as is noted in SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4706 (3rd. Ed. 1943)
as follows:
"The literal interpretation of the words of an
act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature
and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit
vf a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention . . . . The particular inqury is
not what is the abstract force of the words or what
they may comprehend, but in what seMe were
they intended to be used in the act."
Since Section 55-10-81 does not state that the defendant must demand a jury trial or be deemed to
have waived his constitutional right, the apparent intent of the legislature to insure equal treatment to those
charged with a misdemeanor whether in the district or
juvenile court should not be frustrated by implication.
The word "demand" is flexible when viewed in
context, for the paragraph in which it is found is
designed to give the juvenile court judge the power to
tran,~f er cases wherein the defendant has not pleaded
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guilty or waived
right of a jury
merely states the
waiver there is a
for a jury trial.

his right to a jury trial. Since the
trial is inviolate, the word demand
obvious, that is, in the absence of a
conclusive presumption of a demand

Further, if the legislature intended to provide
that the right to a jury trial would be waived if not
demanded they would have provided a third exception
to the first paragraph of Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Sectoin 55-10-81 added by ch. 165, Section 19 ( 1965)
as follows:
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice and
procedure . . . shall conform to the practice
and procedure by law or rule of court for criminal proceedings in the district court, etccept that
the proceedings may be commenced by complaint
and a trial by ,jury shall consist of four ,jurors,"
and ... the right to a jury trial is waived if not
expressly demanded (suggested revision to comport with possible construction).
The Constitutional right to a jury trial is founded
upon the principles that the collective judgments of
an impartial tribunal are, perhaps, less subject to prejudice, that there is a great value in the participation
of citizens in the process of government and that juries
are agencies of mitigation in that they serve to bring
the law up to date by applying it in a way consistent
with present day community values. That a judge may
not invade the province of the jury even in a non-capital
case for the reason that the accused is entitled to a
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trial by jury on "all questoins of fact" was made clear
in State v. Brune, 69 Utah 444, 256 Pac. 109 ( 1927)
iu accordance with the statutory mandate in Section
77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Conviction of an adult off ender for contributing
to the delinquency of a minor without the Constitutional
guarantee of a trial by jury or the express waiver of
that right as required by law is reversible error.

POINT III
AN INCOl\lPLETE RECORD BASED ON
THE USE OF A DICTAPHONE 'VHERE APPEAL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT NECESSITATES A REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE:
I) APPELLANT

HAS BEEN DENIED
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.

2) THIS COURT HAS NOTHING TO RE-

VIEW WITH RESPECT
01\fITTED TESTIMONY.

TO

THE

3) THE USE OF A MECHANICAL DE-

VICE IS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DEVICE FOR RECORDING TESTIMONY
IN AN ADULT OFFENDER CASE IN
THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE
DISTORTION OF THE RECORD SUB-
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VERTS APPELLANT'S STATUTORY
RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM A FINAL
CONVICTION.

*

*

*

I) AN INCOMPLETE RECORD IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 'VHERE APPEAL IS A MATTER
OF RIGHT.

Equal Protection:
Where appeal is a matter of right exercisable only
by the defendant who has means enough to pay the
cost of a transcript in advance there is denial of equal
protection within the meaning of the 14th Amendment.
The reasoning of the court is that the financial ability
to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship
to a defendant's guilt or innocence and cannot be used
to justify depriving defendant of a fair trial. Further,
there is no meaningful distinction between a rule which
would deny the poor the right to defend themselves
in court and one which effectively denies the poor of
an adequate appellate review by demanding costs be
paid in advance. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
The financial ability to pay bears no more rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence than
does the accident of the forum and neither can be used
to justify depriving a defendant of a fair trial. If
appellant had been charged with a misdemeanor in the
district court he would have been supplied with a ver-
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batim record for purposes of appeal, since a reporter
would have been present during the trial. Having been
charged, however, in the juvenile court he was unable
to obtain a complete record. The mechanical recorder
used in the juvenile court was unable to accurately record the proceedings.
In Utah " (a) n appeal may be taken by the defendant, ( 1) from a final judgment of conviction."
Section 77-39-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Thus,
appeal being a matter of right exercisable only by a
defendant who has an accurate record on which the
appellate court can review the action of the trial court,
appellant was denied due process and equal protection
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. It is not
sufficient to state that the part of the transcript which
is audible is sufficient to provide a clear record from
which to exercise the right to appeal for no one can
say that what is missing is immaterial without knowing
exactly what information is being discounted. An incomplete record is just as bad as no record at all for
the testimony or evidence which was most clearly prejudicial or erroneous affording grounds for a new trial
may very well be that which reads "inaudible" on the
transcript. There is no rational basis for distinguishing
between treatment in the district court and in the juvenile court with regard to an adult offender charged
with a misdemeanor for the reason that the rehabilitative purpose with regard to juveniles cannot be said
to apply equally to adult offenders.
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The following are examples of such "inaudible"
areas on the dictaphone belt:
Line 21 Judge Garff:

(Inaudible)

Page I

Line 22 Mr. Grousman: (Inaudible)

Page 6

Line 31 Mr. Grousman: (Did you use it
yourself?)
Line 32 Miss Palmer:

(Inaudible)

Line 23 Mr. Grousman: (Did you stay in
the apartment
the entire two
days?)

Page 6
referring
to needle
Page 6
Page 8

Line 24

(Next part inaud- Page 8
ible on the dictaphone belt)

Line 25

(Next part inaud- Page 8
ible on the dictaphone belt)

Line 26 .Miss Palmer:

(If I could have
some)

Page 8

Line 5

Judge Garff:

(You're forgeting about Wanda's rights.)

Page 25

Line 6

]\fr. Gundry:

(This witness has Page 25
waived her rights
by taking the
stand against
this man.)

Line 8

Judge Garff:

( .. more time.)
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Page 25

Due Process
In a case where the court reporter had died prior
to completing the transcription of his notes and another
person was allowed to try and decipher the notes with
the aid of statements from the judge and the prosecutor,
in the face of a formal protest from the Court Reporters' Association of Los Angeles to the effect that there
was grave doubt that anyone could furnish a usable
transcript from the notes due to the fact that many
portions were completely indecipherable, the Supreme
Court held that an ex parte settlement of the state
court record violated petitioner's right to procedural
due process in not having been represented at the hearings either in person or by counsel. The order of the
court was to remand to the district court to enter an
order to allow California a reasonable time to perfect
the record, petitioner being represented at such hearings and that failing to do so within six months petitioner should bereleased. The reasoning of the court
was that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment required the opportunity for review on a reviewable record. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 ( 1957).
In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 ( 1937), the
Supreme Court laid down the following guide lines
as to whether state procedure violates 14th Amendment
standards of due process:
"Does it violate those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which die at the base of all
our civil and political institutions?" ... Or is it
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"so acute and shocking that our policy will not
endure it?"
The court in Palko in rejecting the defendant's
claim of double-jeopardy as a bar to a new trial reasoned that "if the trial had been infected with error
adverse to the accused, there might have been a review
at his instance, and as often as necessary to purge the
taint. A reciprocal privilege has now been granted the
state." Palko v. Connecticut, supra.
In the instant case appellant's contention that an
incomplete record is a denial of due process for purposes of perfecting his right to an appeal unless the
court grants appellant a new trial. It is a violation
of fundamental principles of liberty and justice to say
that one has a right to appeal on the basis of error as
shown by the record when the means used to record
the trial produces an incomplete record. The very
error which might have deprived appellant of due process may be hidden by a caption on the record which
reads "inaudible".
2) THIS COURT HAS NOTHING TO REVIEW WITH RESPECT TO THE OMITTED
TESTIMONY.

Even if this court finds that due process was not
violated the absence of a complete record for purposes
of review is prejudicial error. In a case where the reporter was not present during oral argument to the
jury the court stated that the judge is required to
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make a proper record of the proceedings at the time
of their occurrence. If he cannot recall what was said
he must determine the facts from the next best evidence, the testimony of those who were present. But,
of course, where the litigants are in dispute it would be
impossible to fairly reconstruct what was said and the
appellate court with respect to the omitted argument,
having nothing it can review, is forced to remand for
a new trial. State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518
(1915).

Since defendant has been charged with "administering drugs'' to the complaining witness it is crucial
that the appellate court has a complete record of her
testimony. However, when she was asked, with reference to the hypodermic needle, " ( d) id you use it yourself?" (Tr. line 31, p. 6), the record reads "inaudible"
(Tr. line 32, p. 6). When asked if she stayed in the
apartment the entire two days the record reads "next
part inaudible on the dictaphone belt" (Tr. lines 24
& 25, p. 8). Further when defendant's counsel objected to the complaining witness's refusal to testify
except as to selected matters the trial judge stated
"(y)ou're forgetting about Wanda's rights" (Tr. line
5, p. 25). Defendant's attorney then objected saying
" ( t) he witness has waived her rights by taking a stand
against this man" (Tr. line 6, p. 25). The ruling on
the objection is not ascertainable for all that appears
is " ... more time." (Tr. line 8, p. 25). Other inaudible
portions of the record are found on line 21, p. 1, trial
judge and line 22, p. 6, prosecuting attorney.
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There is no distinguishable difference between the
absence in the record on appeal of oral argument to
the jury and the inaudible and thus absent statements
of court, counsel and complaining witness, as in the
instant case. In either case the appellate court has
nothing to review, having no magic powers to perceive what was said and not recorded, and must, therefore, order a new trial.
3) THE USE OF A MECHANICAL DEVICE

IS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DEVICE FOR
RECORDING TESTIMONY IN AN ADULT
OFFENDER CASE IN THE JUVENILE
COURT AND THE DISTORTION OF THE
RECORD SUBVERTS APPELLANT'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM A FINAL
CONVICTION.
A recording device is not authorized as the proper
means of making a verbatim record when trying an
adult offender in the juvenile court. With regard to
hearings, the Juvenile Court Act in Utah Code Anno·
tated of 1953, § 55-10-96, added by ch. 165, § 35 (1965),
provides:
" (a) verbatim record of the proceedings shall
be taken, by a court stenographer or by means
of a mechanical recording device, in all cases
which might result in deprivation of custody. In
all other cases a verbatim record shall also be
made, unless dispensed with by the court."
26

The words deprivation of custody in the first
sentence indicate that the legislature intended the section allowing mechanical recording devices to apply
only to cases involved juvenile offenders. The second
sentence seems to indicate that in all other cases the
testimony may be recorded by a mechanical device, but
a reading of the statute on adult offenses demonstrates
that the legislature did not mean to include the phrase
"other cases" those involving adult offenses. Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, § 55-1--81 added by ch. 165, § 19
( 1965) provides:
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice and
procedure of the juvenile court shall conform to
the practice and procedure provided by law or
rule of court for criminal proceedings in the
district court."
In the district courts there is no procedure allowing the use of mechanical recording devices but on the
contrary the statute provides that " ( t) he judge of the
district court may appoint shorthand reporters to report
the proceedings of the court." Utah Code Annotated,
78-56-1, ( 1953) . Further, the shorthand reporter has
a statutory duty to attend all sessions of court. Section
78-56-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"It shall be the duty of the shorthand reporter
to attend all sessions of court, and to take full
stenographer notes of the evidence given and of
all proceedings therein had, except when the
judge dispenses with his services in a particular
cause or with respect to a portion of the proceedings thereof.''
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While the statute allows the judge to dispense
with the services of a reporter, it does not authorize
him to use any other means of reporting, and further
the discretion of the judge to dispense with the reporter
has been severely limited by judicial interpretation.
Where testimony is disputed on appeal and the trial
judge cannot recall what was said the appellate court
will reverse and remand for a new trial, having nothing
it can review with respect to the testimony in question.
State v. Baum, supra.
Further, assuming for the sake of argument that a
recording device is permissible, in the trial of an adult
offender, an inaudible and thus incomplete record would
not meet the statutory command of "verbatim record"
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 55-10-96, added
by ch. 165, § 35 ( 1965). That a verbatim record may
not be dispensed with in cases where deprivation of
custody might result demonstrates the legislature's
intent to make certain that when the treatment of juveniles is penal in nature the right to appeal should not
be thwarted due to the absence of a verbatim record
for purposes of appellate review. Certainly, no lesser
protection was intended for adult offenders who might
lose their freedom by receiving a six month jail sentence.
There are good reasons why the legislature has not
provided for reporting by means of a mechanical device. A committee of judges and lawyers studied the
effects of the latest types of tape recording equipment
in the U. S. District Court in Washington, D.C., and
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submitted a report on May 11, 1961. Their report gave
the following reasons for rejecting the recording devices in favor of maintaining the court reporter system:
"The machine possesses too great a sensitivity
in that it records not only the spoken word, but
coughing, footsteps, rustling of paper and other
extraneous noises. Speech which takes place beyond the perimeter of the microphone is inaudible. In other instances involving proceedings
with multiple parties or multiple counsel, it is
difficult to distinguish from one sound tape precisely what has occurred or who was speaking.
"The machine, therefore, lacks the very important human function of discriminating intelligently as to what transpired." Everett G. Rodebaugh, Sound Recording in the Courtroom: A
Reappraisal, 47 ABA J 1185 ( 1961).
Due to the defects in the quality of producing the
verbatim record the Legislature has wisely not allowed
mechanical recording devices to be used in the district
courts. To do so would subvert the purpose of the
statute providing for court reporters which is to afford
assistance to the court and counsel in conducting the
trial and drawing up findings and bills of exception,
82 C.J.S. Stenographers, § 9 (1953). Since the legislature has not allowed mechanical recording devices,
their use in this case where the record is incomplete is
prejudicial error.
An incomplete record makes meaningful appeal
impossible. "There the Code of Criminal Procedure
gives a right to appeal within the terms of the statute,
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the use of a reporting device which produces an incomplete record would be prejudicial to the rights of
the accused and costly to the state who would have to
grant a new trial on the ground that the record affords
nothing to review. "An appeal may be taken by the
defendant ( 1) from a final judgment of conviction."
Utah Code Annotated, 77 -39-3 ( 1953) . It has been
held that where a stenographer loses his notes so that
a complete record cannot be presented, the trial court
should grant a new trial and save the expense of taking
the case to the appellate court who will review and
remand for a new trial. Elliott v. State, 5 Okl .Crim.
Reporter 63, 113 Pac. 213 (1911).
Even when the parties cannot reach an agreement
as to the unrecorded testimony or the trial judge cannot
recall what was said the court should reverse and remand a new trial. See State v. Baum, supra.
Since, however, memories have faded since the
trial and the possibility of obtaining an accurate record
is highly dubious due to the fact that line 21, page I;
line 22, page 6; line 32, page 6; line 24,, page 8; line
25, page 8; and line 8, page 25 are inaudible as indicated
by the record on appeal, appellant should be granted
a new trial.

POINT IV
THERE WAS A COMPLETE ABSENCE
OF PROOF THAT THE COMPLAINING "\¥IT-
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NESS WAS INJECTED WITH A DRUG AND
THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF WERE
DONE \VITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR
CONSENT OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS' PARENTS OR THAT THE ACTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE MINOR'S DELINQUENCY.
Defendant was found guilty of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor by "hypodermically administering drugs" to the complaining witness. But a
thorough search of the record has failed to produce
any evidence which could in the least substantiate that
finding. The prosecution has left a void in a most
essential step in proving the guilt of the accused. To
convict a man of administering drugs without any proof
whatsoever that what was administered was a drug is
unthinkable.
The complaining witness could only testify that
there was "something in a needle" ( R. p. 5, 1.23) ;
that it "was white liquid" ( R. p. 8, 1.2). Milk is a white
liquid. A mixture of sugar and water is a white liquid.
In response to the question: "Do you know what was
in that needle?" (R. p. 9 1.23), she could only reply
"No" (R. p. 9, 1.24). But compare that answer with
her unequivocal response to the prosecutor's question
concerning her dealings with others after she left defendant: the prosecutor's question: "Did they give you
any drugs?" (R. p. 16 1.17), and her reply, "Yes" (R.
p. 16 1.20).
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The closest the prosecution could come in establishing that a drug had been administered was in eliciting the complaining witness' reaction to the injection,
and that consisted solely of "I felt kind of drowsy
and I felt really good." (R. p. 9 l.32). It is common
knowledge that even a psychological reaction can go
much further than those simple effects (to which this
witness is certainly subject, no derogation of the witness intended) . See in general, Aldrich, Dynamic Psychiatry ( 1966) .
The complaining witness did not say she was under
the influence of drugs while with defendant, but again
in relating her activities with people other than defendant she stated then she was under the influence
of drugs. (See R. p. 18 l.24 & 25). To convict the
defendant of such a serious offense, that of administering drugs to a minor, upon the vapor thin evidence
described above, is unwise at best. Surely the state
ought to be required to prove its case.
The defendant was convicted of administering
drugs to a minor "without the knowledge or consent
of the parents". (Complaint). Here appellant is con·
fronted with a hiatus in the prosecution's duty to prove
its case. Appellant is not quibbling with every jot and
tittle, but with what appears to be a serious omission.
Now here in the record is there to be found so much as
a single statement that what was done was done without
the knowledge or consent of the parents. We cannot
assume that the parents would object to what was done.
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'Vhat was plead must be proved even if just a semblance of proof is all that can be found.
Assuming arguendo that drugs were administered,
there was no proof that they in fact, contributed to any
delinquent behavior on the part of the complaining
witness. The statute states (and the complaint charges
in almost the exact language) that anyone "who aids,
contributes to, or becomes responsible for the neglect
or delinquency of any child", is guilty of the offense.
Section 55-10-80 {3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Of
necessity we cannot avoid being repetitious, there was
absolutely no evidence produced which indicated in any
way that the acts alleged produced any behavior which
could be called delinquent. Without such proof the
mandate of the statute has not been fulfilled, and it
cannot be assumed that the legislature intended the
courts to eliminate their requirements.
All in all there has been a laxness in this case which
cannot be tolerated in the field of criminal law. The
prosecution has failed to prove that ( 1) the complaining witness was injected with a drug; (2) that the
acts alleged were done without the knowledge or consent
of the complaining witness' parents; and ( 3) that the
acts alleged contributed to delinquent behavior of the
complaining witness. Without proof of even one of the
above the case must fall; but without proof as to any
of the elements of the offense charged, the decision is
beyond question.

33

The Legislature has enacted two statutes which
must be distinguished. The first states: "Any person
... who tends to cause children to become delinquent,
"55-10-80 ( 1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is guilty
of the crime stated. It is obvious that the provision
refers to acts which in some way tend to cause delin.
quency in a child. Thus, it is not necessary that the
child become a delinquent as a result of the acts. But
the second provision under consideration, and the one
which appellant has been charged with violating, is as
follows: "Any person ... who aids, contributes to, or
becomes responsible for the neglect or delinquency of
any child", Section 55-10-80 ( 3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is guilty of the crime stated. The second
provision "contemplates an existing delinquency and
that such sitution has been contributed to by another
... " State v. Clark, 92 Ohio App. 382, llO N.E. 2d
433 ( 1952) . In such a case the complaint must allege
and the prosecution must prove that the complaining
witness is or was a delinquent and the defendant to some
degree caused or contributed to that status. See State
v. Clark, supra and Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App. 276
182 N.E. ll7 (1931).
In the instant case the appellant was charged with
contribunting to the delinquency of a minor, but there
was no evidence that the acts complained of caused or
contributed to any delinquent behavior attributed to
the complaining witness. It would indeed be an extreme
view to say that an individual could be convicted of
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contributing to the delinquency of a minor without
requiring that the minor actually is or was a delinquent.
The interpretation of the statute sought above
seems to be an intermediate view, one which both protects an accused from harrassment, but also meets the
intent of the legislature. It has already been pointed
out that one extreme is represented by the New York
court in People v. Smith, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 512, 266 App.
Div. 57 ( 1943), where the court requires that the minor
actually be adjudged a delinquent before the defendant
can he charged.
Since the evidence was wholly insufficient to convict appellant of the crime charged, reversal is required.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
431 South 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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